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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
nka CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
Case No. 88-0559-CA 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is a cross-appeal from an appeal filed by Plaintiff. 
Jurisdiction in the matter is conferred up to this Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(q). 
II. ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto are photocopies of Utah Code Annotated §§15-
1-1 and 78-37-4. 
DATED this t*\ «'• March, 1989. 
MCDbNALD & BULLEN 
A-H-A « JcDonald 
Attorney for Defendant-Appeii ant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the |^ \ day of March, 1989, I 
served a copy of the foregoing Supplement to Brief of Cross-
Appellant by causing said document to be personally delivered to 
the following named persons at the following addresses: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for PIaintdTBr-Respondent 
426 South 500 Easjr 
Salt Lake City, l/T 84102 
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TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
IN GENERAL 
Chapter 
1. Interest. 
2. Legal Capacity of Children. 
3. Interparty Agreements. 
4. Joint Obligations. 
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed]. 
6. Prompt Payment Act. 
7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
Section Section 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Con- 15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
tracted rate. 15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate. 
(1) Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. Nothing in this section may 
be construed to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge which by law 
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before May 14, 1981. 
(2) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action. 
History: L- 1907, ch. 46, § 1; CJL 1907, 
S 1241; CJL 1917, $ 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; 
L. 1935, ch. 42, $ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend-
ment increased the rate in the first sentence 
from 6% to 10%; and changed the date at the 
end of the last sentence from 1907 to 1981. 
The 1985 amendment designated the exist-
ing language as Subsection (1); inserted 
"Except when parties to a lawful contract 
agree on a specified rate of interest" at the be-
ginning of Subsection (1); substituted "chose in 
action" near end of first sentence of Subsection 
(1) for "things in action**; substituted "Nothing 
in this section may be construed to in any way" 
at beginning of second sentence of Subsection 
(1) for "But nothing herein contained shall be 
so construed as to in any way"; substituted 
"May 14,1981** at the end of Subsection (1) for 
"the 14th day of May 1981**; and added Subsec-
tion (2). 
Cros8-References. — Pawnbrokers, maxi-
mum charges by, § 11-6-4. 
Payment of interest as extending statute of 
limitations, § 78-12-44. 
Rate where unspecified in instrument, 
§ 70A-3-118. 
Regulation by special laws prohibited, Utah 
Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
742 
78-37-4 JLDICUL CODE 
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys. 
If there is surplus money remaining after payment of the amount due on the 
mortgage, hen or encumbrance, with costs, the court may cause the same to be 
paid to the person entitled to it, and in the meantime mav direct it to be 
deposited in court 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, * 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-37-4 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Junior mortgagee. redemption in property, was not precluded 
Junior mortgagee, who was made party to from claiming surplus from foreclosure sale b> 
foreclosure suit by senior mortgagee, and who reason of failure to assert his rights by cross 
was bound by decree which barred him from bill or otherwise Cowan v Stoker, 100 Utah 
any right in property and barred all equity of 377, 115 P 2d 153 (1941) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am Jur. 2d Mortgages C.J.S. — 59 C.J S Mortgages § 799 
*} 930 et seq Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 567 
78-37-5. Sales — Wh£n debt due in installments. 
If the debt for which the mortgage, lien or encumbrance is held is not all 
due, then as soon as sufficient of the property has been sold to pay the amount 
due, with costs, the sale must cease, and afterwards, as often as more becomes 
due on principal or interest, the court may, on motion, order more to be sold. 
But if the property cannot be sold in portions without injury to the parties, the 
whole may be ordered to be sold in the first instance, and the entire debt and 
costs paid, but there shall be a rebate of interest where such rebate is proper. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, £ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-37-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Motion for further proceedings. ment creditor, although later redeemed from 
—Notice. original sale, but only on attorney for mort-
gagor. Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust 
Service. Co., 20 Utah 103,57 P. 845, 77 Am. St. R. 902 
Notice of motion for farther foreclosure and (1899). 
sale need not he served on mortgagor's judg-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages C J . a — 69 CJ.S. Mortgages § 730. 
§ 556. Key Numbers. — Mortgages «=» 512. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
nka CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
Case No. 88-0559-CA 
Respondent-Cross-Appellant, Cass Bettinger (hereinafter 
referred to as "Defendant), submits the following brief in 
support of his cross appeal. Inasmuch as no brief has been 
submitted in support of Appellant's appeal (assigned case number 
88-0297-CA) no responses is made to the issues raised by said 
appeal. Appellant will be hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff". 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review: 
(a) Is a person holding a lien on real property 
responsible for costs of improvement and costs of sale 
incurred by the owner of the real property after the lien 
1 
arises so that the owner may deduct such costs from the 
indebtedness secured by the lien? 
(b) Is a creditor entitled to interest on indebtedness 
for the period that the indebtedness remains unpaid in 
circumstances where the agreement between the parties and 
the decree incorporating the agreement make no mention of 
interest? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Defendant submits that the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§15-1-1 are determinative of the issues relating to interest. 
This section provides as follows: 
"Interest rates - Legal rate-
Contracted rate. 
(1) Except when parties to a 
lawful contract agree on a 
specified rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, 
or chose in action shall be 10% per 
annum..." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on August 14, 
1980. The decree awarded the marital domicile of the parties to 
Plaintiff, subject to a lien in favor of Defendant. 
Shortly after the sale of the marital domicile on August 13, 
1987, a dispute arose as to the amount of the sale proceeds to 
which each party was entitled. When it appeared that the parties 
2 
were unable to resolve the dispute by negotiation, Defendant 
filed a motion with the lower court to resolve the dispute. 
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable David 
S. Young, Third District Court Judge, on February 9, 1988. On 
February 18, 1988, Judge Young issued a Memorandum Decision with 
respect to the issues raised by the parties. The Memorandum 
Decision was later incorporated into an Order dated March 11, 
1988 (hereinafter "subject Order"). The subject Order is the 
basis of Plaintiff's appeal and Defendant's cross appeal. 
On March 18, 1988, Defendant filed a motion, pursuant to 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the subject 
Order or grant a new trial. However, before the lower Court made 
a decision on the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff filed a premature 
Notice of Appeal with this Court on May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals 
No. 88-0297 CA). The lower Court denied Defendant's Rule 59 
motion by Order dated September 13, 1988. Defendant thereafter 
filed this cross appeal on September 26, 1988. 
Plaintiff has not yet filed a brief in support of her appeal 
filed on May 5, 1988 (Case No. 88-0297-CA). Thus, Defendant 
cannot respond to the issues raised by Plaintiff in her appeal as 
directed by Rule 24(h), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. A 
motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal in Case No. 88-0297-CA is 
filed with this brief. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Decree of Divorce in this action entered on August 14, 
1980, clearly provided that Plaintiff was to be awarded the 
3 
ownership of the family home subject to a lien in favor of 
Defendant. The relevant paragraph of the Decree is quoted on 
page 7, infra. The Decree further provided that the lien in 
favor of Defendant was "forecloseable" when the youngest child 
reached 18, or when the home was sold or when Plaintiff 
remarried. 
Plaintiff remarried on August 14, 1984 (Tr. 34). This was 
the first occurrence of an event making the lien to Defendant due 
and payable. 
Subsequent to Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff demonstrated 
her clear understanding that she was the sole owner of the home 
and that Defendant was merely a lienholder (Tr. 54). She 
continued to live in the home for a period of approximately one 
year with her new husband (Tr. 7); at the time she first listed 
the home for sale, she was the only signer on the listing 
agreement (Tr. 8-9); she never provided Defendant with any 
opportunity for input on the listing price of the home (Tr. 12); 
she instructed the listing realtor that Defendant was not 
entitled to any information concerning the listing or offers for 
sale (Tr. 9, 23); and she made significant capital improvements 
on the home without prior notice or consultation with Defendant 
(Tr. 71). 
At the time of Plaintiff's remarriage, the market value of 
the home was SgS^OO.OO1 (Memorandum Decision, para. 2) and the 
1The value stated in the text represents the Court's findings. Plaintiff's expert testified 
the value of the home in August, 1984 was $89,000.00 (Tr. 65; Ex. 7). Defendant's expert stated 
a value of $100,000.00 (Tr. 21; Ex. 4). 
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unpaid balance of the mortgage $20,304.002 (Memorandum Decision, 
para. 3). 
Shortly after Plaintiff's remarriage, the parties attempted 
to negotiate a means to pay Defendant's equity (Tr. 34-35; 14-
15). However, the negotiations were unsuccessful. Thus, 
Plaintiff decided to sell the home (Tr. 35). 
The home was first listed for sale in 1984 (Tr. 35). The 
listing was renewed several times and continued until an offer 
was received to purchase the home in March, 1987, for $91,500.00 
(Tr. 46; Ex. 1). Plaintiff accepted the offer and sale took 
place on August 13, 1987 (Ex. 1). The costs of sale were 
$6,113.00 (Memo. Decision, para. 4; Ex. 1). 
It was apparent that the market value of the home decreased 
between August 30, 1984 (the date that Plaintiff remarried) and 
August 13, 1987 (the date the home was sold) (Tr. 22, 69). 
In October, 1984, one month after Plaintiff's remarriage, 
and during her occupancy of the home with her new husband, 
Plaintiff expended $164.79 for screens on the home (Memo. 
Decision, para. 5). In the summer of 1986, approximately two 
years after Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff expended $7,800.00 
for roof repairs and reconstruction of the roof of the home 
(Memo. Decision, para. 5; Tr. 38-43). These improvements were 
made by Plaintiff without any prior notice or acquiesence of 
Defendant (Tr. 71). 
2The Court's finding as to the amount of the unpaid mortgage balance was taken from Exhibit 
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The decline in the real estate market between August, 1984 
(date of remarriage) and August, 1987 (date of sale) more than 
offsets the increase in the value of the home by reason of the 
improvements made by Plaintiff (Tr. 22, 69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
(a) Costs of Improvements. The indebtedness of a 
debtor to a secured creditor is not reduced by the 
costs of improvements made by the debtor to the 
collateral. 
(b) Costs of Sale. The wording of the Decree 
obligating Defendant to pay one-half of the costs of sale is 
applicable only when the sale of home is the triggering 
event making the lien due and payable. Defendant is not 
liable for costs of sale when the triggering event is 
Plaintiff's remarriage and the sale does not occur for more 
than three years after the remarriage. 
Point II 
The Decree of Divorce incorporates the provisions of an 
agreement which was entered into between the parties with the 
advice of counsel wherein indebtedness was created without 
mention of interest if the indebtedness was not paid on the date 
it was due and payable. Furthermore, pursuant to the terms of 
the agreement and Decree, Defendant had a chose in action to 
enforce his lien when Plaintiff remarried inasmuch as the lien 
6 
was then "forecloseable". In both situations, Utah Code 
Annotated §15-1-1 provides interest at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF 
IMPROVEMENTS MADE AFTER PLAINTIFF'S 
REMARRIAGE AND COSTS OF SALE OF THE HOME 
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter 
provides as follows: 
"Plaintiff is awarded the real 
property of the marriage in the 
form of a home located at 2740 East 
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
subject to a lien thereon for one-
half of the equity that may be in 
the house at the time of 
liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value 
increases). The equity is defined 
as the fair market value or sales 
price at the time Defendant becomes 
entitled to liquidate his lien as 
set forth herein, less the amount 
of mortgages, costs of improvements 
made by Plaintiff and costs of 
sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest 
child reaches 18, or until the home 
is sold or until Plaintiff 
remarries..." 
In its memorandum decision dated March 18, 1988 the lower 
Court found: (a) The value of the home in August, 1984 (the 
date Plaintiff remarried) was $95,000.00; (b) The unpaid 
7 
mortgage balance on the date of Plaintiff's remarriage was 
$20,304.00. 
These findings establish that the total equity in the home 
on the date of Plaintiff's remarriage was $74,696.00. According 
to paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, this equity should have 
resulted in Defendant receiving the sum of $37,348.00 which 
represented one-half of the equity at the time of Plaintiff's 
remarriage ($74,696.00 divided by 2 equals $37,348.00). 
Despite the findings as to market value and the amount of 
the mortgage balance, the lower Court held that Defendant should 
receive only $30,309.00. 
The basis for the reduction from $37,348.00 to $30,309.00 
was the Court's finding that Defendant was responsible for one-
half of the costs incurred by Plaintiff in the repair and 
replacement of the roof in the summer of 1986 ($7,800.00); 
application of new screens on the home on or about October 14, 
1984 ($164.79); and, costs arising out of the sale of the home in 
August, 1987 ($6,113.00). The total of these costs was 
$14,077.78. One-half of these costs ($7,038.89) were assessed 
against Defendant thereby reducing his share of the sale proceeds 
to the figure of $30,309.11 ($37,348.00 minus $7,038.89 equals 
$30,309.11). 
Defendant contends that the assessment of these costs 
constitutes error. Each of these assessments will be discussed 
separately. 
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A, COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS 
The language authorizing deduction of costs of improvements 
clearly refers to improvements made prior to the date Defendant's 
lien became due and payable inasmuch as the language authorizing 
the deduction is prefaced by the words "at the time Defendant 
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien". Moreover, it is 
apparent that if the language made reference to improvements 
after the lien was payable, Defendant would be paying for 
improvements to Plaintiff's home with no possibility to benefit 
by any increase in market value by reason of the improvements. 
The roof repair and replacement of $7,800.00 was undertaken 
in the summer of 1986, after the time Plaintiff remarried (Tr. 
38-39). The costs relating to the screens ($164.79) was incurred 
on or about October 14, 1984, after Plaintiff's remarriage (Memo 
Decision, para. 5). Both expenditures occurred while Plaintiff 
was the sole owner of the home and while Defendant? s interest was 
limited to his lien. Plaintiff's claim that Defendant must bear 
one-half of the costs of these improvements is not only 
inconsistent with the concept of the rights and obligations of 
lienholders, but is inconsistent with Plaintiff's actions at the 
time the improvements were made. Plaintiff undertook the 
improvements without any prior notice or consultation with 
Defendant (Tr. 71). 
Defendant has found no authority from any jurisdiction 
holding that secured indebtedness is decreased by the costs of 
9 
improvements to the collateral. The improvements benefit only 
the debtor. Utah Code Annotated §78-37-43. 
Plaintiff's claims are made with the benefit of hindsight--
knowledge that real estate values decreased after August, 1984. 
It is readily apparent that if the market forces together with 
the improvements had enhanced the market value of the home so 
that the selling price in 1987 exceeded the 1984 market value, 
Plaintiff would be claiming sole entitlement to the benefit of 
the increase.4 This Court should not permit Plaintiff to compel 
Defendant to bear a portion of the loss from the decline in the 
market when he could not have shared in the gain had the market 
increased. 
B. COSTS OF SALE 
Paragraph 7 of the decree gran ts Defendant a l i e n on the 
home as of the date of the decree (August 14, 1980). The amount 
of t h e l i e n v a r i e d with t he va lue of the home u n t i l the 
occur rence of one of t h r e e even t s : " . . . t h e youngest ch i ld 
r eaches 18, or u n t i l t he home i s sold , or u n t i l P l a i n t i f f 
remarries1 1 . 
3Utah Code Annotated §78-37-4 clearly provides that sale proceeds from the collateral which 
are in excess of the indebtedness go to the debtor if there are no junior liens. 
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly provides that Defendant benefits from increases in equity 
only until Plaintiff remarries (or the occurrence of one of the other triggering events). 
Defendant's share of the equity was frozen on that date. Thus, had the value of the home 
increased after Plaintiff's remarriage, she would be entitled to the full amount of the increase. 
Inasmuch as Defendant is precluded from sharing in any increase in value after Plaintiff's 
remarriage, he should likewise be insulated from any decrease in value during the same period. 
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As previously noted, Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984. 
At that time, the decree clearly states that the amount of the 
lien is then determined and the lien is immediately due and 
payable, i.e., the lien is then "forecloseable". 
If the triggering event had been sale of the home rather 
than Plaintiff's remarriage, it is clear that Defendant would be 
liable for a portion of the costs of sale. However, since the 
triggering event was Plaintiff's remarriage, and the debt was due 
and payable on the date of the remarriage, there were no costs of 
sale. Defendant respectfully submits that it constitutes error 
to allow Plaintiff's failure to timely pay the lien to result in 
a decrease in the value of the lien. 
In order to equitably determine the parties' respective 
share of the sale proceeds, the Court must hypothetically set-up 
a closing on August 30, 1984, the date that the lien became due 
and payable. One could not seriously contend that on that date 
Defendant is liable for the costs of sale that would occur three 
years later. At that point in time, Plaintiff was living in the 
home (Tr. 7) and a future sale with resulting selling costs would 
involve pure speculation. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST 
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly states that Defendant's 
lien is due and payable on the date of Plaintiff's remarriage. 
This provision of the Decree was based upon a lawful agreement 
11 
which the parties entered into with the advice of counsel and 
thereafter announced in open Court (Tr. 11-12). This agreement 
did not specifically provide for interest in the event Plaintiff 
failed to timely pay the lien. Furthermore, since Defendants 
lien was "forecloseable" on the date that Plaintiff remarried, 
Defendant had a "chose in action" to enforce the lien on that 
date. Finally, Plaintiff's failure to pay the lien for a period 
of three years after it was due and payable constitutes 
"forbearance" in such payment. 
The Utah legislature has specifically addressed this precise 
situation of a lawful contract without mention of interest, a 
"chose in action" and a "forbearance" in the payment of money. 
Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1 provides: 
"Interest rates - Legal rate-
Contracted rate. 
( 1 ) Except when parties to a 
lawful contract agree on a 
specified rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, 
or chose in action shall be 10% per 
annum..." 
Inasmuch as the legislature has addressed the precise situation 
and the statute was in full force and effect on the date of the 
agreement between the parties and thereafter, and such agreement 
was entered into with the benefit of counsel, the only logical 
presumption is that the parties knew of the existence of the 
statute and chose not to exclude its application. 
It is apparent that Defendant exercised restraint in 
enforcing his rights out of concern for the impact on the minor 
12 
children born of the marriage. However, Defendant never waived 
interest on the debt and his restraint does not alter the clear 
wording of the decree that designates the time for the payment of 
the lien as August 30, 1984. 
It would be extremely inequitable not to assess interest in 
this situation for the following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiff and her new husband lived in the home 
for a period of approximately one year after Plaintiff 
became obligated to pay Defendant's lien. It would be 
grossly inequitable to permit her to both free rent and no 
interest on the use of the funds which were then due and 
payable to Defendant. 
(b) During the period of time that Plaintiff has not 
paid interest on her indebtedness to Defendant, the lien 
against the home has decreased from $20,304.00 (the pay-off 
amount in August, 1984) to $16,687.00 (the pay-off on the 
date of the sale, Ex. 2).5 It is inequitable to permit 
Plaintiff to benefit by the decrease in the indebtedness 
while, at the same time, she is excused from paying any 
interest on her debt to Defendant which was due and payable 
during this entire period of time. 
(c) If Defendant had asserted his rights in August, 
1984, Plaintiff would likely have had to borrow sufficient 
funds to pay and discharge the lien and thereby grant a 
second mortgage to the lender. In such a situation, 
5The lower Court computed equity by deducting the $20,304 amount (Memo. Decision, para. 7). 
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Plaintiff would have been required to make monthly payments 
to the second lienholder at interest rates that would have 
been higher than the statutory rates. Thus, the assessment 
of interest does not prejudice Plaintiff. 
(d) If Plaintiff had paid Defendant's lien at the time 
it was due and payable, Defendant could have invested the 
funds and received the income therefrom. 
(e) Plaintiff totally excluded Defendant from any 
input on the terms and provisions of the sale and listing 
agreement. Inasmuch as she exercised sole dominion over the 
sale of the home, and did not permit Defendant to provide in 
put in the sale, she can be the only contributor in the 
delay in selling the home. Even if it be assumed, for the 
sake of argument, that the long delay in sale was not the 
fault of Plaintiff, the fact still remains that she had a 
clear and unequivocal obligation to pay Defendant one-half 
of the equity as of August 30, 1984 regardless of whether 
the home was sold. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject Order entered by the lower Court should be 
reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff as follows: 
(a) Judgment in the sum of $7,039.00 representing the 
difference between the $30,309.00 awarded by the Court and 
the $37,348.00 which represented the amount of Defendant's 
14 
lien together with interest at the rate of 10% per annem 
from August 30, 1984 to date of judgment; 
(b) Judgment in an amount equal to interest at the 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on $30,309.00 from 
August 30, 1984 to the date said sum was paid. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED H^iis "j * day of March, 1989 
1! 
n 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant 
Cross-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'ill 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ' day of March, 1989, I 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Cross-
Appellant upon the following named persons by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Plairvfcirff-Respondent 
426 South 500 Eas;T I 
Salt Lake City, 0T 84102 
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